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Abstract 
 
Embedded in traditional culture perpetuating family-centered elderly care, informal care 
is still viewed as a family or moral issue rather than a social and policy issue in South 
Korea. Using newly available microdata from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging, 
this study investigates the effect of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes in 
South Korea. By doing so, this study provides evidence to inform elderly long-term care 
policy in South Korea, and also fills a gap in the international literature by providing 
results from an Asian country. Empirical analyses address various methodological issues 
by investigating gender differences, by examining both extensive and intensive labor 
market adjustments with two definitions of labor force participation, by employing 
different functional forms of care intensity, and by accounting for the potential 
endogeneity of informal care as well as intergenerational co-residence. Robust findings 
suggest negative effects of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes among women, 
but not among men. Compared with otherwise similar non-caregivers, female intensive 
caregivers who provide at least more than 10 hours of care per week are at an increased 
risk of being out of the labor force by 15.2 percentage points. When examining the 
probability of employment in the formal sector only, the effect magnitude is smaller. 
Among employed women, more intensive caregivers receive lower hourly wages by 
1.65K Korean Won than otherwise similar non-caregivers. Informal care is already an 
important economic issue in South Korea even though aging is still at an early stage.  
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1. Introduction 
 
South Korea is experiencing rapid population aging. The aged dependency ratio, 
defined as the number of persons aged 65 or older divided by the number of persons aged 
15-64, grew from 5.7% in 1970 to 12.6% in 2005, and is projected to increase to 72.0% 
in 2050 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2006). This demographic transition suggests 
that the working-age population in South Korea has an increasing burden of supporting 
the elderly population and the economy as a whole at the macroeconomic level. At the 
same time, given current family-centered elderly care in South Korea, decreasing fertility 
rates suggest that working-age individuals will face a greater likelihood to care for their 
elderly parents than before. Such double burden on the working-age population raises the 
question of whether the current elderly long-term care system, which is almost entirely 
dependent on informal care by family members, has labor market costs. This question is 
particularly salient because South Korea, one of the East Asian Tigers, will no longer 
enjoy the so-called demographic dividend that contributed to its economic boom for the 
past few decades (Bloom et al., 2000). 
Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to informal care in the policy and 
research arena in South Korea. Embedded in traditional culture perpetuating family-
centered elderly care (Sung, 1990; Chee, 2000), informal care is still viewed as a family 
or moral issue rather than a social and policy issue in South Korea. Policymakers may 
even rely on the cultural tradition of filial piety as policy measures to address issues of an 
aged society (Shin and Shaw, 2003), as exemplified by the legislation of Promoting and 
Supporting Filial Piety Act (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2007). Moreover, although 
public long-term care insurance started in South Korea in 2008, most debates to date have 
focused on implementation issues of financing and provision of formal long-term care 
services (Sunwoo, 2004; Kwon, 2008). Little discussion has so far been directed at the 
interface between formal and informal care, let alone the benefits and costs of informal 
care itself. 
This paper examines the effect of informal caregiving on caregivers’ labor market 
outcomes in South Korea. Despite the staggering magnitude and speed of population 
aging in Asia (Kinsella and Velkoff, 2002; United Nations, 2002a, 2002b), this issue has 
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rarely been studied in this region, except for recent work from Japan (Shimizutani et al., 
2008). In a recent systematic review of the literature on informal caregivers’ labor supply 
published in English between 1986 and 2006 (Lilly et al., 2007), thirty-five articles 
included for its final review are all from North America and Europe. This dearth of 
literature in Asia is even more pronounced with the recent interest in cultural and 
institutional differences within European countries (Spiess and Schneider, 2003; Crespo, 
2006; Bolin et al., 2008). This paper fills the gap in the international literature by using 
newly available, nationally representative, and internationally comparable data from 
South Korea. 
To compare with previous studies and to provide a more complete understanding 
of the effect of caregiving on labor market outcomes, this study pays special attention to 
four methodological issues importantly recognized in the literature (for an overview of 
key issues in the literature, see Lilly et al., 2007). First, considerable gender differences 
may exist in the effects of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes, because gender 
affects decisions on living arrangements, caregiving, and labor supply (Finley, 1989; 
Fredriksen, 1996; Dentinger and Clarkberg, 2002; Carmichael and Charles, 2003). As a 
traditionally patriarchal society, South Korea may exhibit more pronounced gender 
differences in the effect than Western cultures. To examine such gender differences 
explicitly, I estimate all empirical models separately by gender. Second, this study not 
only examines labor supply adjustments at both extensive and intensive margins but also 
accounts for the large informal sector in the labor market, particularly among women 
(Chen et al., 1999). To do so, labor force participation differentiates employment in the 
formal sector from participation in any type of market work, which includes self-
employed or unpaid family work as well as employed work. For these two different 
definitions of labor force participation, I also examine wage rate and hours worked, 
respectively, to investigate possible adjustments at the intensive margin. Third, to 
examine for possible non-linearity and threshold effects (Ettner, 1995; Carmichael and 
Charles, 1998), I employ a categorical specification of informal care intensity as well as a 
continuous one. Finally, following the more recent literature (Crespo, 2006; Heitmueller, 
2007; Bolin et al., 2008), this study accounts for the potential endogeneity between 
informal care and labor market outcomes. This study also recognizes that living 
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arrangement decisions are also potentially endogenous to caregiving decisions (Stern, 
1995; Pezzin et al., 1996; Pezzin and Schone, 1999). Therefore, intergenerational co-
residence is another potential endogenous variable in models of labor supply. Given its 
high prevalence and occurrence before caregiving decisions in South Korea as in many 
Asian countries, the issue of co-residence merits due attention. Fortunately, cultural and 
institutional settings of South Korea allow for exploiting potential sources of 
identification using family-level instrumental variables (IVs). 
Robust findings suggest negative effects of informal caregiving on labor market 
outcomes among women, but not among men. Informal care is already an important 
economic issue in South Korea even though population aging is still at an early stage. 
This study also contributes to the literature with interesting findings in the 
aforementioned four methodological issues. 
 
2. Survey of the Literature and Conceptual Framework 
 
Survey of the Literature 
A small but increasing body of literature has examined the effect of informal 
caregiving on caregivers’ labor market outcomes. In the US, although earlier studies can 
be traced back to the 1980s (Muurinen, 1986), the majority of studies have been 
published during the past twenty years (for a list of articles, see Lilly et al., 2007). The 
heightened research interest in the US in the 1990s reflects continued demographic 
changes and their implications for the labor force. As Ettner (1995) points out, economic 
research had previously been more interested in child care and its effect on female labor 
supply than in elderly parent care, which plays an increasingly important role with 
population aging. In more recent years, the literature on this issue proliferated from 
Europe (Carmichael and Charles, 1998; Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Crespo, 2006; 
Heitmueller, 2007; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007; Casado et al., 2007; Bolin et al., 2008).  
Two major limitations were identified in earlier empirical work linking caregiving 
and paid work (Ettner, 1995; Stern, 1995; Norton, 2000). First, the issue of the 
endogeneity between caregiving and labor force participation was not addressed 
explicitly; therefore, it was hard to establish the causal effect of caregiving on labor force 
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participation. The second major limitation with earlier studies was that they used only 
actual caregiver samples (Stone and Farley-Short, 1990; Boaz and Muller, 1992), thus 
limiting the generalizability of study results because of selection bias (Ettner, 1995; 
Norton, 2000). Both limitations are related to the availability of a large sample of 
potential caregivers. Many recent studies from North America and Europe exploit data 
from large, population-based studies and also account for endogeneity (Wolf and Soldo, 
1994; Stern, 1995; Ettner, 1995, 1996; Latif, 2006; Crespo, 2006; Heitmueller, 2007; 
Bolin et al., 2008). In the following review, I focus on key findings and major 
methodological issues in these more recent papers. 
Wolf and Soldo (1994) use data from the National Survey of Families and 
Households and find no effect of informal caregiving on the probability of being 
employed or on conditional hours of work among married women in the US, although the 
authors acknowledge that the binary measure of caregiving may not reflect the wide 
variability of time commitments to care. Ettner (1995) uses data from the 1986-1988 
Survey of Income and Program Participation and employs a three-dummy specification 
of informal caregiving: co-residing with a disabled parent; extra-residential care hours 10 
per week or more; and extra-residential care hours less than 10 hours per week. Co-
residing with a disabled parent is assumed to be the most intensive form of caregiving 
and thus treated as endogenous in addition to the other two dummy variables for extra-
residential care. Using the number of siblings and parental education as IVs, she finds 
that co-residing with a disabled parent has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
the probability of women’s participating in the labor force and on work hours. Due to 
data limitations, parental education, predicting parental care needs only indirectly, was 
used as the instrumental variable. Exploiting better measures of parental health status in 
the 1987 NSHF, Ettner (1996) employs a similar IV approach and corroborates her 
previous results that co-residence with a disabled parent and extra-residential caregiving 
have negative effects on the labor supply, although their statistical significance varies. 
Both studies assume that an adult child co-residing with a disabled parent actually 
provides informal care in the home. 
More recent studies from non-US settings largely attest to the negative effects of 
caregiving on labor supply, although sub-group differences were noted. Viitanen (2005) 
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uses panel data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to examine the 
relationship between informal care for the elderly and labor force participation among 
female adults across Europe. Exploiting the panel data, Viitanen (2005) finds substantial 
state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the dynamics of female 
labor force participation. Sub-group analysis revealed the greatest negative effects on 
middle-aged women and single women. Combining the methodological finding on state 
dependence on labor force participation, the policy implication is that informal caregiving 
could contribute ultimately to old-age poverty among females assuming caregiving 
responsibilities in their midlife. Casado et al. (2007) also use the Spanish subsample of 
the ECHP to examine the effects of informal care on female labor force participation. 
Their study results suggest that labor opportunity costs exist for co-residing caregivers 
but not for extra-residential caregivers. Using the longitudinal nature of the data, they 
also find that only caregiving lasting for more than a year has negative effects on labor 
force participation. 
Several recent studies were conducted in the British context. Heitmueller (2007) 
uses data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and estimates the effects of 
caregiving on labor force participation using both IV and panel data estimation. Results 
from both estimation methods show that the negative effects of caregiving exist only for 
co-residential carers and for caregivers providing more than 20 hours of care per week. In 
a different study using the BHPS, Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) also show that informal 
caregivers earn less even when participating in the labor force, supporting previous 
findings from another UK study (Carmichael and Charles, 2003). 
Release of the SHARE data has provided the opportunity to examine the issue of 
the conflicts between caregiving and employment in a multi-national European context. 
Crespo (2006) derives two different but largely comparable samples from the SHARE 
and employs a bivariate probit model to account for the joint decision between care and 
paid work. She focuses on the effect of intensive caregiving on labor force participation 
of midlife women, and finds substantial negative effects, ranging from approximately 30 
to 50 percentage points, for both the northern and southern European countries. 
Interestingly, accounting for the endogeneity of intensive caregiving produced more 
statistically significant and much stronger negative estimates. If taking on a caregiving 
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role reflects the person’s unemployability, correcting for the endogeneity may show less 
significant and smaller effect magnitudes, as postulated in Heitmueller (2007). Bolin et al. 
(2008) also uses data from the SHARE and employs an IV estimation strategy. In their 
model specification, the hypothesis of exogeneity of hours of informal care was not 
rejected in models of employment, conditional hours worked, and conditional hourly 
wage rate. Latif (2006) uses Canadian data from the General Social Survey and also 
employs a similar IV approach. Test results indicated that caregiving was not endogenous 
in the probit model of employment and conditional ordinary least squares (OLS) models 
of the number of work hours. Caregiving, defined as a binary variable, was found to 
decrease work hours statistically significantly for employed women, but not for men. 
Probit estimates of the effect of caregiving were not statistically significant. 
Co-residence deserves some additional consideration for empirical work (Lilly et 
al., 2007) particularly for studies in South Korea and many other Asian countries. 
Intergenerational household formation that well precedes caregiving may involve 
different implications from co-residence triggered by caregiving. Previous studies have 
suggested that co-residential caregivers are more likely to be out of the labor force than 
extra-residential caregivers (Ettner, 1995, 1996; Carmichael and Charles, 2003), while 
the opposite was also found (White-Means, 1997). It is not the same, however, what co-
residence captures in the empirical work. 
Co-residential care is often used as a proxy for more intensive care than extra-
residential care (Ettner, 1995, 1996; Carmichael and Charles, 2003), because co-
residence may reflect care recipient’s higher care needs and caregiver’s higher time 
commitment to informal care. In White-Means (1997), co-residence concerns the 
structure of informal care and is included as a control variable in the regression models. 
However, co-residence itself is potentially endogenous to labor force participation. 
Several papers examined the issue of endogeneity of co-residence in the context of 
elderly care. Pezzin et al. (1996) recognize that the choice of a certain type of living 
arrangement may be determined by the mix of formal and informal care, which in turn 
can be affected by publicly provided formal care. In a later work, Pezzin and Schone 
(1999) find that both co-residence and informal caregiving are less likely to occur among 
adult daughters with higher time demands for other activities, such as number of children. 
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Their findings suggest that informal caregiving and intergenerational co-residence are 
different modes of assistance to elderly parents, and that publicly provided formal care 
could affect both co-residence and caregiving decisions. Pezzin et al. (1996) propose that 
the total effect of publicly provided formal care on informal care can be decomposed into 
two components: the direct effect (change in care hours) and the indirect effect (change in 
the probability of choosing a particular living arrangement). Stern (1995) also 
acknowledges the potential endogeneity between adult children’s informal caregiving and 
their distance characteristics and labor force participation. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Economic models of supply of informal care can be modified to explain informal 
caregivers’ decision regarding labor force participation (Norton, 2000). The hallmark of 
such economic models is that the provision of informal care requires a trade-off with 
work and leisure. Thus, one important area for empirical work is to examine the effect of 
informal caregiving on labor force participation, which has been done in the US (for a 
summary, see Norton, 2000). Recent papers on the empirical question provide a 
summarized list how informal caregiving might affect labor market decisions 
(Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007). 
The full effects of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes consist of two 
main effects: substitution effect and income effect (Carmichael and Charles, 2003; 
Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007). Through the substitution effect, caregivers are less likely 
to be in the labor force, because the reservation wage increases for the remaining hours 
after informal care is given. Through the income effect, caregivers are more likely to 
remain in the labor force, because fewer working hours and greater expenditures due to 
caregiving will reduce their disposable incomes and induce them to maintain their income 
source in the labor market. Caregivers will choose not to work only when the substitution 
effect exceeds the income effect. Thus, caregiving may not necessarily deter labor force 
participation and may even increase the likelihood of being in the labor force, providing 
an interesting empirical question. It seems plausible that the relative magnitudes of the 
substitution and income effects vary depending on the intensity of informal care. More 
intensive caregivers, for example, who provide 40 hours of care per week, would find it 
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hard to maintain their paid work even with decreased work hours because the substitution 
effect will dominate the income effect. On the other hand, less intensive caregivers still 
might be able to combine work and care (Ettner, 1995; Carmichael and Charles, 1998). 
Less intensive caregivers may have even higher labor market attachment than otherwise 
similar non-caregivers. Therefore, there may be some threshold for care intensity below 
which no significant negative effect exists and above which the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect (Carmichael and Charles, 1998).  
Figure 1 presents hypothesized relation between care intensity and labor market 
attachment, which is determined mainly by the combination of the income effect and 
substitution effect at a given level of care intensity. Labor market attachment, as a latent 
variable, is likely to differ by gender. In many societies, including South Korea, the 
income effect of informal caregiving is likely to be higher among men than among 
women. Furthermore, compared with women, men may also be affected to a lesser extent 
by the substitution effect of caregiving. As a result, women are likely to have lower labor 
market attachment at a given level of caregiving and also a lower threshold level of 
informal care, above which labor market attachment is low enough for the caregiver to 
choose to leave the labor force.  
While this hypothesized gender difference may be true of independent men and 
women at a societal level, the division of labor between married men and women serves 
as an institutional setting that further polarizes the direction of the countervailing effects 
of informal caregiving on labor market attachment. Once the caring responsibility falls on 
a married adult child, specialization may take place within the nuclear family. The 
woman of the nuclear family, whose time costs are typically lower than her husband’s, 
may then decide to leave the labor force for care of her parent-in-law or parent. For the 
man, the caring responsibilities may require even higher earnings than before because his 
wife does not bring income any longer. Therefore, in a household providing parental care, 
the man may be more likely to stay in the labor force because of the income effect, 
whereas negative effects of caregiving on labor market attachment will concentrate on the 
woman. Even though the man shares the responsibility of caring for his mother with his 
wife, the presence of his wife as the primary caregiver or at least an additional caregiver 
will considerably lessen the substitution effect of his caregiving.  
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The burdensome nature of caregiving and its workplace consequences suggest 
some additional effects. A respite effect exists when caregivers use work to take a break 
from caregiving (Stone and Farley-Short, 1990; Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003; 
Heitmueller, 2007). Furthermore, informal caregivers may experience discrimination in 
wage or promotion because they may require higher flexibility and show less reliability 
than other employees (Carmichael and Charles, 1998; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2006; 
Heitmueller, 2007). Even without obvious and perceived discrimination effects, 
caregivers themselves might prefer job opportunities with less demanding responsibilities 
and more flexible work arrangements so that they may continue to combine work and 
caring (Carmichael and Charles, 1998). Moreover, caregivers may be less likely to invest 
in career development necessary for better job placements in their future career. Even 
previous caregiving history may negatively affect labor market opportunities for persons 
who want to return to the labor force. Labor market decisions are made throughout the 
life-course (Henz, 2004). Given such multiple and long-term effects of caregiving, Lilly 
et al. (2007) propose that future research needs to look at labor market adjustments 
within the caregiving trajectory. One research question here is whether caregivers may 
earn less than their otherwise similar counterparts even when participating in the labor 
force and working for the same hours.  
In addition, caregiving may have negative effects on other critical human capital 
for the labor market, mainly health. That is, caregiving may also have indirect effects on 
labor market outcomes through its detrimental health effects such as depression among 
dementia caregivers (Wilson et al., 2007). In this scenario, health status is a mediating 
variable for the effect of caregiving on labor market outcomes. Therefore, estimates on 
non-health (direct) effects of caregiving will depend on the extent to which a statistical 
model accounts for caregiver’s health status. The effects of informal caregiving on labor 
market outcomes will be estimated as the sum of these counteracting effects. However, 
estimating the effects in empirical work is not simple. The existing literature provides 
several reasons why caregiving might be endogenous to labor market outcomes in 
standard statistical models.  
Caring responsibilities may occur disproportionately more in disadvantaged 
families (Heitmueller, 2007). This argument is closely related to the phenomenon of 
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familial aggregation in disease and disability from the literature on socioeconomic 
inequalities in health. That is, families with a disabled person are more likely to have 
individuals with already fewer employment opportunities. In this argument, 
socioeconomic status is an omitted factor that affects both caregiving and labor market 
outcomes. If the empirical model does not control adequately for family-level 
socioeconomic status, the estimate of the effect of caregiving will overstate the true effect 
on labor market outcomes. However, even if family-level socioeconomic status is 
controlled for, one should consider three typical types of potential endogeneity issues for 
linking caregiving and labor market outcomes. 
First, caregiving may be correlated with unobserved ‘unemployability’ 
(Heitmueller, 2007), causing the typical source of endogeneity bias due to omitted 
variables. That is, self-selection into caregiving may be more likely among individuals 
with poorer prospects for employment. A similar yet not identical argument can also be 
made. Individuals with high opportunity cost of time are less likely to quit working to 
provide informal care, because they would prefer to substitute formal care for informal 
care (Heitmueller, 2007). Hence, caring responsibilities may fall on individuals with 
lower opportunity costs of time, or lower ‘ability’ (Heitmueller, 2007). 
Second, current employment can be “a sign of revealed preference for market 
rather than home production” (Ettner, 1995). Family members who are not currently 
working are more likely to take on the caring role. In a typical cross-sectional study, this 
issue of reverse causality or simultaneity is hard to address. Reverse causality may also 
arise because the labor market situation can affect caregiving decisions (Heitmueller, 
2007). The discrimination effect can also lead to this endogeneity bias. Rather than 
continue combining work and caring responsibilities, the caregiver experiencing wage 
penalties may stop working altogether. Such individuals will then show longer caring 
hours and higher rates of unemployment in the data. Consequently, the negative effect of 
caregiving will be overstated. 
Third, measurement error for the amount of caregiving may also introduce 
endogeneity bias. Measurement of informal care hours in general presents a great 
challenge (Van den Berg and Spauwen, 2006), and the metric of hours of informal care 
does not adequately capture the intensity or quality of informal care (Van Houtven and 
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Norton, 2008). Given that, a caregiver or a care recipient may self-adjust the quality of 
care and then report informal care hours differently depending on the care quality and 
possibly on the caregiver’s revealed commitment to caregiving. If a caregiver’s being in 
the labor force is perceived as lower commitment to caregiving by the care recipient, then 
the care recipient may under-report hours of informal care actually received. On the other 
hand, co-residing caregivers out of the labor force may over-report their actual care hours, 
not only because it is hard to tease out informal care hours from their living with the 
disabled care recipient but also because their higher commitment to caregiving may make 
them believe they are providing more hours of care than they actually provide. This 
second possibility, non-random measurement error, causes another source of endogeneity 
bias. If over-reporting of care hours occurs among caregivers out of the labor force, this 
endogeneity bias from measurement error will overstate the effect of caregiving on labor 
market outcomes. Despite their different pathways, these reasons all lead to the argument 
that not controlling for endogeneity may overestimate the potential negative effect of 
informal caregiving on caregivers’ labor market outcomes. 
Some further considerations are relevant to the cultural and institutional setting in 
South Korea. First, the endogeneity of informal caregiving may be weakened. Traditional 
cultural norms in Korea dictate who provides parental care in the family based on birth 
order and gender — the eldest son and his wife in the co-residential household. Moreover, 
the lack of culturally acceptable and substitutable formal care does not allow for many 
strategic decisions regarding informal care between parents and adult children. Together, 
these factors suggest that, in South Korea, informal caregiving may have been determined 
largely exogenously at the population level. This exogeneity may not hold in the future 
and even for current younger generations. 
Second, informal caregiving may be correlated with higher unobserved ability 
and employability in Korea. The previous literature implicitly assumed that adult children 
maximize one utility function for the extended family. In such a unitary household model, 
specialization occurs between siblings so that a sibling with lower ability is more likely to 
assume the caring role to their disabled parent. Such a unitary household model ignores 
that married adult children also consider the utility of their own nuclear families. 
Furthermore, family pressure for parent care is on the shoulders of better-off and more 
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able children, who have a spacious house with extra room for the disabled parent. It 
follows that caregiving may not necessarily be correlated with unemployability, lower 
ability, or lower opportunity cost of time. Therefore, the “marginal caregiver,” who is 
most likely to vary in their decisions on informal care with potential caregiving 
responsibilities, may be different from what has been typically postulated in the previous 
literature. 
Finally, co-residence needs special consideration. In traditional Korean extended 
families, decisions on intergenerational co-residence typically precede decisions on 
parental care. Then, one natural question is whether co-residence to begin with, rather 
than informal caregiving, is endogenous to labor supply, particularly for the daughter-in-
law in a multi-generation household. An adult child’s decisions on intergenerational 
living arrangements and on his or her labor supply may not be independent. Adult 
children who are less willing to work outside the home or less able to find a market job 
may decide to co-reside with their parents or parents-in-law. Although co-residence may 
generally require higher commitments to parents and home, co-residence will not 
necessarily affect negatively adult children’s labor market outcomes. Elderly parents are 
increasingly an important source of child care in South Korea, supporting their daughter’s 
or daughter-in-law’s employment. Women with higher attachments to the labor force 
may prefer to co-reside because their elderly parents can help her with child care and 
other household work. This phenomenon is also observed in Japan (Sasaki, 2002). 
Therefore, co-residence is potentially endogenous to labor market outcomes, particularly 
for younger generations. If an adult daughter’s co-residence follows her decision on 
informal caregiving, either by moving in or having her parents move in, co-residence 
may reflect a structure for caregiving or care intensity, as implicitly postulated in much of 
the previous literature. In that case, controlling for the endogeneity of informal care 
would be sufficient. On the other hand, informal caregiving superimposed on 
intergenerational co-residence raises a different methodological challenge that both 
variables are potentially endogenous. 
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3. Empirical Methods 
 
Data and Sample Selection 
This study uses the first-wave data from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging 
(KLoSA). The KLoSA is a nationally representative study of non-institutionalized South 
Korean adults aged 45 or older in fifteen large administrative areas (Seoul Metropolitan 
City, six other Metropolitan Cities, and eight Provinces, excluding Jeju Province for the 
sake of survey convenience). This original study population is followed up every two 
years, with an Off-Year Survey planned in intervening years. In the first wave survey 
conducted between July and December 2006, 10,254 individuals in 6,171 households (1.7 
per household) were interviewed face-to-face using the Computer-Assisted Personal 
Interviewing (CAPI) method. 
The KLoSA was pre-designed to facilitate international comparability with other 
panel studies on aging, especially with the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US 
and the SHARE (Smith, 2006; Boo & Chang, 2006). Overall survey themes of the 
KLoSA are consistent with those of the HRS and SHARE, including questionnaires on 
demographics, family and family transfers, health, employment, income, assets and debts, 
expectations and life satisfaction. Unlike other comparable studies, the baseline KLoSA 
had its lower-limit age criterion at 45, not 50, to better capture the increasingly unstable 
employment status among Korean adults in their mid-40s and their retirement decisions 
(Boo et al., 2006). To focus on the typical working-age population in South Korea, I 
exclude individuals aged 65 or older (n=4,155). After excluding the few observations 
with missing values, the final samples have 2,278 men and 3,366 women. 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Labor market outcomes  
I define four labor market outcomes. First, I define a binary variable of Any 
employed work as 1 if an individual is employed and as 0 if not. For the employed, I 
consider a continuous variable of hourly wage rate, which is calculated using the formula, 
(monthly income)/(weekly hours worked×4). Next, I define another binary variable of 
Any work to include self-employed and unpaid family workers as well as employed 
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workers. For those in Any work, I consider weekly hours worked as the respective 
continuous variable of interest. All these variables are based on responses for their 
current primary job. To account for the right-skewed distribution of the two continuous 
variables, I take the natural logarithm. 
 
Key independent variable: Informal care 
In the KLoSA survey, the respondent was first asked to identify “any family 
members (spouse, parents, parents of spouse, siblings and/or children) over the age of 10 
who are unable to carry out activities of daily living (ADL)” (see Appendix for the 
questionnaire). ADLs were explained to the respondent as “(referring) to everyday 
routines such as eating, dressing, bathing or using the toilet, etc.” Then, the respondent 
was asked whom, if any, the respondent provided any help with ADLs during the past 12 
months. Following that question, the respondent was asked roughly how many hours per 
week and subsequently how many weeks he or she provided help during the same period. 
Using this information, I first calculate the sum of ADL care hours provided to family 
members. Similar questions were asked for IADL care, which was described as “(help) 
with other things such as household chores, errands, transportation, grocery shopping, 
financial management, etc.” Another difference in those questions between ADL and 
IADL care was that IADL care was only asked for family members who were not living 
with the respondent. In case responses were given in months, KLoSA interviewers were 
instructed to enter 4 for 1 month, 26 for 6 months, and 52 for 1 year, respectively. I add 
the number of ADL and IADL care hours for a particular family member at the 
respondent-observation level. Then I sum up all care hours provided to more than one 
person at the respondent-observation level. By dividing the number by 52, I obtain 
averaged weekly hours of care the respondent provided during the past 12 months.  
I take the natural logarithm of (1+weekly care hours) to account for the right 
skewedness in distribution. In addition, I create a set of two dummy variables 
representing less intensive care and more intensive care with the omitted reference 
category being no care. I use 10 hours per week as a cutoff commonly used in previous 
empirical work (Ettner, 1995; Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003), and also use 20 as 
another cutoff for sensitivity analysis. 
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 Other explanatory variables 
In addition to these key study variables, statistical models control for individuals’ 
demographic and socioeconomic factors, health status, region of residence, and parental 
characteristics. Demographic and socioeconomic factors include age, marital status, 
education level, household assets, and house ownership. Household assets are first 
calculated as the total sum of present values for detailed items of financial and real estate 
assets. These items include own house; real estate, such as land, rental real estate, a 
partnership, or money owed to you on a land contract or mortgage except your current 
home; cash over 500,000 Korean won, bank savings, stocks/trusts/mutual funds, bonds, 
insurance, private money lending, mutual savings club, etc.; money in installment 
deposits, certificates of deposits, and other savings accounts; stocks and mutual funds 
bonds; personal loans to be repaid; saved through traditional private savings club (Gye); 
vehicles for transportation; any other assets, such as valuables, paintings, antiques, and 
golf membership. I aggregate the sum of assets at the household level, and categorize all 
households into quintiles, thus creating four dummy variables on the lowest to the second 
highest quintiles. For health status, I include disability and poor self-rated health as 
control variables. I create fourteen dummy variables representing each large 
administrative area, with the omitted category being Seoul Metropolitan City. 
Variables on parental characteristics include whether both parents live together, 
parent’s house ownership, and parent’s education level. For parent’s education level, I 
take any higher education level between father and mother. I include these parental 
characteristics for two main reasons. First, parental characteristics may affect the amount 
of informal care provided by children. If both parents live together, their children will be 
far less likely to provide informal care and, if ever, less amount of care. Parents having a 
house and higher education levels may capture their socioeconomic status, thereby 
affecting their health status and care needs. Second, these parental characteristics may 
also influence children’s labor market outcomes. Parent’s education level could capture 
unobserved educational investment in children during childhood, which may persist 
through adulthood. Therefore, parental characteristics are expected to serve as important 
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control variables in both first- and second-stage regressions in the structural equation 
models. 
 
Instrumental variables (IVs) 
Three IVs for informal care are all binary indicator variables: 1) whether parent(s) 
have any ADL limitation, 2) whether parent(s)-in-law have any ADL limitation, and 3) 
whether any sibling or relative has any ADL limitation. These IVs should strongly predict 
one’s probability of providing informal care or intensity of care but should not directly 
affect one’s labor market outcomes. Furthermore, there is hardly any plausible 
explanation that these IVs may violate the monotonicity condition; that is, each IV must 
predict the endogenous variable either positively or negatively. 
 
Sample Description 
Summary statistics of the study variables are presented in Table 1. Stark gender 
differences are observed in labor market outcomes. Women are less likely to participate 
in the labor force than men, for both Any work and Any employed work. Although those 
in Any work do not reveal any gender difference in weekly hours worked, employed 
women on average earn only half as much as employed men do. Women provide 
informal care more often than men do. Furthermore, caregiving women provide more 
hours of care than caregiving men do. Caregiving women are also more likely to become 
intensive caregivers. 
Compared by informal care intensity, labor market outcomes are generally poorer 
among more intensive caregivers than among less intensive caregivers or non-caregivers, 
particularly for women (Table 2). However, some outcomes are even better among less 
intensive caregivers than among non-caregivers.  
 
Estimation Strategy 
I estimate the following model in general form: 
sissisisisi XCORESIDEICLMO εμδγβ ++++= .  Eq. (1) 
where subscript s denotes sibling group, subscript i individual, LMOsi labor market 
outcomes of individual i from a sibling group s, ICsi informal care, and CORESIDEsi a 
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binary variable of whether the adult child co-resides with his or her parent(s). ICsi may 
take on logged weekly hours of informal care or a set of two dummy variables for less 
intensive and more intensive care with the reference being no caregiving. Xsi is a vector 
of other explanatory variables, μi sibling-group fixed effects, and εsi the error term. This 
model estimates β, γ, and δ for respective variable(s). The coefficient(s) of main interest 
are β. 
The conceptual framework indicates that this statistical model may suffer from 
the identification problem for the following reasons. First, informal caregiving occurs 
more often among socially disadvantaged families, whose adult children have lower 
prospects for employment and thus are more likely to provide care. If the statistical 
model cannot control for important family characteristics using a given set of control 
variables, informal caregiving is correlated with unobserved family characteristics: 
0),( ≠ssiICCorr μ . 
Second, informal caregiving may be correlated with unobserved ability or employability 
at the individual level: 
0),( ≠sisiICCorr ε . 
Third, an adult child’s decision on co-residence can be made jointly with his or her 
decision on market work. Moreover, co-residing adult children may have different levels 
of employability to begin with: 
0),( ≠sisiCORESIDECorr ε . 
Fixed effects estimation could exploit within-sibling group variation as 
identifying information (Norton and Van Houtven, 2006). However, such an estimation 
strategy still depends on a rather strong assumption that, within each sibling group, 
caregiving responsibilities fall on one or more siblings in a random fashion. This 
assumption fails if family members make decisions on who provides care based on their 
ability or employability, which is not easily observed in empirical data. To address this 
methodological challenge, this study employs an IV approach. In an IV approach, it is 
critical to find good instruments, variables that have strong explanatory power for the 
endogenous explanatory variable in the first-stage equation and that can also be validly 
excluded from the main equation. In this study, family members’ functional limitation 
provides potentially promising IVs because family members’ functional limitation will 
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increase the possibility of one’s providing informal care but will not directly affect one’s 
labor market decisions (Ettner, 1995; Bolin et al., 2008).  
Eq. (1) raises another major challenge for the empirical estimation because not 
only IC but also CORESIDE are potentially endogenous to LMO. The statistical model 
could be estimated validly if appropriate instruments were available that predict both IC 
and CORESIDE but do not directly affect LMO. Theoretically, such IVs might be 
available from family-level (parent-level or sibling-level) characteristics because both 
informal caregiving and intergenerational co-residence can be different forms of 
intergenerational relations with elderly parents. However, I do not use an IV approach for 
the two endogenous explanatory variables for two related reasons. First, in many Korean 
extended families, the co-residence decision is made long before the decision about 
informal caregiving. In such cases, decisions on informal caregiving are made in the 
given living arrangement of intergenerational co-residence. Therefore, it would not make 
much sense to treat co-residence and informal caregiving as decisions that necessarily 
happen at the same time horizon in a given cross-sectional dataset. Second, this 
conceptual issue also leads to the difficulty of implementing an IV approach practically, 
because it is hard to find IVs that have strong predictive power for both co-residence and 
informal caregiving. In fact, when both sibling-level and parent-level variables were 
included in the first-stage models of co-residence and informal caregiving, sibling-level 
variables (e.g., number of brothers and number of sisters) showed strong predictive 
power for co-residence but only weak associations for informal caregiving. By contrast, 
parent-level variables (e.g., parents’ ADL and IADL limitations) were found to be strong 
predictors for informal caregiving but not for co-residence. 
As an alternative approach, I follow a staged analysis plan. In a preliminary 
analysis, I use subsamples of KLoSA respondents’ adult children to test for the 
endogeneity of co-residence with regard to labor force participation. For the purpose of 
comparison by gender/age group, I estimate a bivariate probit model not only for the 
midlife (aged 45-64) but also younger (aged 25-44) adult child subsamples.  
 22* εδγ ++= XCORESIDELFP      Eq. (2) 
 31* εφδ ++= IVXCORESIDE      Eq. (3) 
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where LFP* and CORESIDE* are latent variables for the indicator variable of LFP (1 if 
LFP*>0, otherwise 0) and for the indicator variable of CORESIDE (1 if CORESIDE*>0, 
otherwise 0). X denotes the same variables as in Eq. (1), and IV is instrumental variables 
used for the CORESIDE equation. If the two decisions on co-residence and on labor force 
participation are independent, the two probit equations can be estimated separately. If the 
two decisions are not independent, estimating Eq. (2) alone will produce inconsistent 
coefficient estimates. In that case, consistent estimates can be obtained by estimating the 
two equations jointly in the bivariate probit model. A formal test on whether the two 
decisions are independent or not can be conducted by examining a likelihood-ratio test of 
whether rho, the correlation coefficient between ε2, and ε3, is statistically different from 
zero or not. 
In estimating the bivariate probit model, sibling-level variables are a source of 
promising IVs. Because of the diffusion of responsibilities (Schulz, 1990), number of 
brothers and number of sisters will have the effect of decreasing one’s probability of co-
residing with his or her parents, but these variables are unlikely to directly affect one’s 
probability of participating in the labor force. For the same reason, being the eldest son in 
the family is another potential IV in the male subsamples. Tests of exclusion restrictions 
follow Rashad and Kaestner (2004). The summarized results in Table 3 suggest that the 
IVs can be validly excluded from the main equation. The likelihood-ratio tests of rho=0 
suggest different results by age group but not by gender, indicating that exogeneity of co-
residence cannot be rejected among midlife adult children. Based on these results, I 
proceed to estimate the main model with co-residence included as an exogenous control 
variable. 
 
Source of Identification 
The source of identification in this study comes from individuals who had any 
family member with a functional limitation and thus provided informal care. Bivariate 
analyses in Table 4 suggest that a family member’s functional limitation is highly 
correlated with informal caregiving but largely not correlated with labor market outcomes. 
Results of specification tests for the IVs provide formal tests for the assumptions 
(Table 5). The test results are consistent regardless of whether informal care intensity is 
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defined as a continuous variable or as a set of two dummy variables. F-statistics for joint 
significance of the IVs are large, suggesting that the IVs have good explanatory power 
for informal caregiving. The IVs also pass the test of exclusion restrictions. The results of 
the exogeneity test suggest that exogeneity cannot be rejected in any of the models. 
 
Supplemental Analysis 
Detailed information on respondents’ adult children in the KLoSA data allows for 
constructing comparable samples. A similar approach has been taken for the SHARE data 
(Crespo, 2006). I construct two subsamples: younger (aged 25-44) and midlife (aged 45-
64) adult child subsamples. I use forty-five as the cutoff age to create these two 
subsamples so that both the midlife adult child sample and the main study sample can 
have the same age group of 45-64. Using respondents’ functional limitations as 
instruments for adult children’s informal caregiving, I find that informal caregiving has a 
negative effect on caregivers’ labor force participation among women across age groups, 
but not among men. This supplemental analysis also detects endogeneity of caregiving in 
some models. The full results of the supplemental analysis are not presented here but are 
available on request. 
 
4. Results 
 
The estimation results show negative effects of informal caregiving on labor 
market outcomes among women, but not among men (Tables 6-7). For men, most 
coefficient estimates do not reach statistical significance, except for two positive 
coefficients in conditional wage models in Table 7. For women, however, providing 
informal care appears to have negative effects on labor force participation (either Any 
work or Any employed work) although statistical significance varies by specification of 
care intensity. More intensive caregivers show statistically significant and negative 
coefficients of larger magnitude, while less intensive caregivers have statistically 
insignificant and positive coefficients of smaller magnitude. These findings suggest that 
increasing care intensity has threshold effects, because less intensive caregiving does not 
appear to decrease the probability of labor force participation. Rather, the positive 
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coefficients suggest that less intensive caregiving may even have beneficial effects on 
labor force participation, although the coefficients do not reach statistical significance. 
Related to this finding, the results of conditional hours worked show another interesting 
finding. That is, less intensive caregivers may be able to combine work and care but, if 
they do, they work fewer hours and earn less. Taken together, these results suggest that 
more intensive caregiving and less intensive caregiving may have different effects on 
labor market outcomes at the extensive/intensive margins. Therefore, I use the preferred 
dummy-variable specification to present incremental effects of two levels of informal 
care intensity. 
Table 8 shows incremental effects of less intensive and more intensive caregiving 
on labor market outcomes. Again, the effects of caregiving on labor market outcomes are 
concentrated among female, more intensive caregivers. For this group, the negative 
effects on labor market outcomes are found at both extensive and intensive margins. 
Compared with otherwise similar non-caregivers, female caregivers providing at least 10 
hours of care per week are at an increased risk of being out of the labor force by 15.2 
percentage points. For employed work, the effect magnitude is smaller (8.2 percentage 
point reduction). Among employed women, more intensive caregivers appear to receive 
lower hourly wages by 1.65K Korean Won than otherwise similar non-caregivers.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
This study has produced several interesting methodological findings that 
contribute to the international literature. First, although previous studies have noted 
gender differences in labor market effects of caregiving (Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 
2003; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007; Bolin et al., 2008), this study shows more striking 
gender differences from an Asian country. The stark gender differences in caregivers’ 
labor market outcomes found in this study could be explained in several ways: 1) The 
income effect can be stronger among men than among women, because men are primarily 
responsible for bringing in household income; 2) The point where the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect may be higher among men than among women; and 3) 
Married caregiving men are better able to adjust their care hours to maintain their market 
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work, in which case their wives may have to relinquish their market work to be the 
primary caregiver in the home. Two data-related issues could also have contributed to 
these gender differences. Part of care hours reported by a married man may reflect care 
provided by his wife, who likely shares the caring responsibility. Furthermore, the 
number of male caregivers in the study sample may not be large enough to detect 
statistically significant effects. 
Another related point is the importance of accounting for labor market 
characteristics in a given economy. To some extent, the large magnitude of negative 
effects of caregiving among women is attributable to the lower quality of their jobs in the 
labor market. Compared with employment in the formal sector, market work in the 
informal sector could be replaced more easily with informal elderly care when needed. 
This study shows that the negative effect of informal caregiving on labor force 
participation is larger for Any work than for Any employed work. In future research, the 
choice of labor market outcomes and operational definition of labor force participation 
warrants caution in developing countries with a large informal labor sector (Hill, 1983) 
Third, by combining various labor market outcomes and different specifications 
of care intensity, this study provides a fuller picture of caregivers’ labor market behavior. 
The results provide some evidence on the threshold effect that, up to a certain level of 
care intensity, caregiving does not necessarily deter labor force participation (Ettner, 
1995; Carmichael and Charles, 1998). Less intensive caregivers appear to be even more 
likely to participate in the labor force, although the results are statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, among labor force participants, less intensive caregiving can negatively 
affect hours worked or wage rate. Taken together, these results suggest that informal 
caregiving could affect labor market outcomes in a more complex way than was posited 
in the previous empirical work. One relevant research implication here is that a 
continuous variable of informal care intensity may fail to capture non-monotonic and 
threshold effects of care intensity. 
Fourth, although the main models in this study do not detect endogeneity between 
caregiving and labor market outcomes, findings from the supplemental analyses imply 
that accounting for endogeneity is important and will be more so in the future. When 
subsamples of adult children derived from the KLoSA data were used, endogeneity was 
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detected with respect to not only caregiving but also intergenerational co-residence in 
several models of labor force participation. This finding may be in part because the 
models used fewer control variables and in part because individuals, particularly younger 
generations, are more likely to make their decisions on parental care or living 
arrangements in relation to their labor market decisions. By contrast, among current older 
(midlife) generations, informal caregiving may be more likely to exogenous with the 
cultural tradition of filial piety, where parental support responsibilities are determined 
mainly based on birth order and gender. 
Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the cross-sectional nature of 
the data not only precludes the possibility of examining temporal sequence of caregiving 
and work transitions but also hinders investigating possible effects of duration-related 
variables. Although the IV approach may partially address the issue of reverse causality, 
longitudinal data with long duration would provide more opportunities to enhance the 
empirical work. The duration of caregiving can also be an important factor affecting labor 
market outcomes. Furthermore, while the wage differentials may suggest cumulated 
effects of discrimination and unfavorable work trajectories (Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007; 
Bolin et al., 2008), the data in this study do not allow for further investigation. Second, 
compared with data from other aging studies, the data include a relatively lower 
proportion of caregivers because the recent rapid aging may not yet be fully reflected in 
caregiving at the population level. Third, this study did not explore possible 
heterogeneous effects by important individual characteristics or the type of informal care. 
For example, different types of caregiving tasks such as assisting with daily living and 
providing companionship were not taken into account, although they may have different 
effects on labor market outcomes.  
Future research exploiting longitudinal data from the KLoSA would provide 
opportunities to improve study designs and to answer other related questions. One 
particularly interesting and policy-relevant study will be to investigate the effects of 
South Korea’s public long-term care insurance introduced in 2008 on formal and 
informal care use, living arrangements, and caregivers’ labor market outcomes. Such 
studies will add to the literature produced from Japan’s recent experience with transition 
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in elderly long-term care (Oura et al., 2007; Shimizutani et al., 2008; Hanaoka and 
Norton, 2008). 
The main policy implication of this study is that informal caregiving is already an 
important economic issue in South Korea even before the full effects of rapid population 
aging in the recent decades have appeared. Although family-centered elderly care has 
often been touted as a great asset to support the welfare state of South Korea, the current 
elderly care system has its own costs as well, in the form of poorer labor market 
outcomes of caregivers. These costs may go beyond individuals. As evident from the dual 
burden placed on the working-age population, individual caregivers’ foregone incomes 
also mean reduced income tax revenue, decreased contribution to pension funds, and 
increased societal expenditures to support caregivers out of the labor force (Ettner, 1995; 
Latif, 2006). Moreover, these costs may aggravate socioeconomic and gender inequalities 
in income and may last into late life. Given a certain out-of-pocket price for formal care, 
substituting formal care is financially more difficult among poor families; thus, they have 
fewer choices other than providing informal care at the expense of their own employment. 
Thus, informal caregiving can exacerbate old-age poverty and income inequality 
(Harrington Meyer, 1996; Viitanen, 2005). Caregiving may put disproportionately more 
women at the risk of giving up work for caregiving, investing less in training, and 
consequently settling for a less favored employment trajectory along the life course. 
These effects collectively may lead to an increased probability of older women’s living in 
poverty (Wakabayashi and Donato, 2005). The projected demographic transition in South 
Korea foretells that such problems will intensify rapidly. This study identifies female 
intensive caregivers as a priority group for immediate policy attention, for both elderly 
long-term care policy and labor policy. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics, by gender 
Male (N=2,728)  Female (N=3,366) Variables 
Mean/Freq, SD/%  Mean/Freq, SD/% 
Labor market outcomes      
Any work (1=yes, 0=no) 2,035 74.9%  1,169 34.8% 
Weekly hours worked if any 48.7 16.8  48.7 19.6 
Any employed work (1=yes, 0=no) 1,044 38.3%  582 17.3% 
Hourly wage rate (10K Korean Won) if any 1.27 1.00  0.61 0.56 
Informal care      
Any informal care (1=yes, 0=no) 59 2.2%  118 3.5% 
Informal care hours per week if any 20.0 33.3  36.6 49.3 
Provide care less than 10 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) 33 55.9%  50 42.4% 
Provide care 10 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) 26 44.1%  68 57.6% 
Provide care less than 20 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) 41 69.5%  68 57.6% 
Provide care 20 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) 18 30.5%  50 42.4% 
Parent(s)’ functional limitations      
Parent(s)’s ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 96 3.5%  97 2.9% 
Parent(s)-in-law’s ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 17 0.6%  42 1.2% 
Sibling or relatives’ ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 60 2.2%  83 2.5% 
Co-residence with parent(s) (1=yes, 0=no) 470 17.2%  368 10.9% 
Other own characteristics      
Age (year) 54.1 5.8  53.9 5.9 
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 2,531 92.8%  2,837 84.3% 
Education      
Elementary school  (1=yes, 0=no) 505 18.5%  1,299 38.6% 
Middle school  (1=yes, 0=no) 510 18.7%  739 22.0% 
High school  (1=yes, 0=no) 1,127 41.3%  1,079 32.1% 
College (1=yes, 0=no) 586 21.5%  249 7.4% 
Total assets quintile (1: lowest, 5: highest)      
Quintile 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 455 16.7%  617 18.3% 
Quintile 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 438 16.1%  606 18.0% 
Quintile 3 (1=yes, 0=no) 570 20.9%  692 20.6% 
Quintile 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 648 23.8%  731 21.7% 
Quintile 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 617 22.6%  720 21.4% 
Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 2,108 77.3%  2,572 76.4% 
Disability (1=yes, 0=no) 207 7.6%  121 3.6% 
Poor self-rated health (1=yes, 0=no) 409 15.0%  781 23.2% 
Other parental characteristics      
Both parents live together (1=yes, 0=no) 266 9.8%  388 11.5% 
Parent(s) owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 466 17.1%  593 17.6% 
Parent(s) no formal education (1=yes, 0=no) 1,317 48.3%  1,658 49.3% 
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Table 2. Labor market outcomes, by gender and care intensity 
  Male    Female  
Panel A: No care vs. any care hour 0 > 0  0 > 0 
Any work (%)  75.1 67.8  35.0 29.7 
Weekly work hours, hours (mean) 49 51  49 46 
Any employed work (%) 40.0 33.9  17.8 15.3 
Hourly wage rate, 10K KRW (mean) 1.26 1.81  0.61 0.45 
                                                (median) 1.00 1.76  0.45 0.38 
Panel B: cutoff at 10 hours per week 0 0<hr<10 hr ≥ 10  0 0<hr<10 hr ≥ 10 
Any work (%)  75.1 78.8 53.8  35.0 42.0 20.6 
Weekly work hours, hours (mean) 49 53 47  49 44 50 
Any employed work (%) 40.0 36.4 30.8  17.8 24.0 8.8 
Hourly wage rate, 10K KRW (mean) 1.26 1.98 1.55  0.61 0.47 0.41 
                                                (median) 1.00 2.14 1.37  0.45 0.36 0.39 
Panel C: cutoff at 20 hours per week 0 0<hr<20 ≥ 20  0 0<hr<20 ≥ 20 
Any work (%)  75.1 73.2 55.6  35.0 38.2 18.0 
Weekly work hours, hours (mean) 49 53 45  49 46 47 
Any employed work (%) 40.0 34.1 33.3  17.8 19.1 10.0 
Hourly wage rate, 10K KRW (mean) 1.26 1.89 1.61  0.61 0.46 0.42 
                                                (median) 1.00 1.76 1.54  0.45 0.35 0.44 
Notes: KRW=Korean Won. 
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Table 3. Tests for bivariate probit models of co-residence and labor force participation 
 Adult child aged 25-44 Adult child aged 45-64 
 Male Female Male Female 
Wald test of IV strength chi2(3)=49.77** chi2(2)=57.09** chi2(3)=60.43** chi2(2)=12.35**
Test of exclusion 
restrictions 
Number of brothers 
Number of sisters 
Being eldest son in family 
chi2(1)=0.40 
chi2(1)=1.38 
chi2(1)=0.18 
chi2(1)=1.40 
chi2(1)=3.32 
- 
chi2(1)=0.97 
chi2(1)=0.00 
chi2(1)=0.06 
chi2(1)=0.00 
chi2(1)=1.40 
- 
Good IVs? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR  test of rho=0 chi2(1)=3.86* chi2(1)=12.59** chi2(1)=0.23 chi2(1)=0.13 
Conclusion: Co-residence is 
endogenous to LFP? Yes Yes No No 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children, excluding observations with any parental ADL/IADL 
limitation. IV=instrumental variable, LFP=labor force participation. Other variables included in the model 
are age, education level, marital status, house ownership, number of children, and parent's marital status, 
house ownership, assets, and region dummies. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 4. Informal care and labor market outcomes, by gender and family member ADL status 
 Male  Female 
aAny ADL limitation of family member? No Yes p value  No Yes p value 
Number of observations 2,559 171 -  3,150 219 - 
Informal care        
Provided any informal care (%) 0.4 28.1 <0.001  1.6 31.1 <0.001 
Categorization of care intensity        
No informal care (%) 99.6 71.9   98.4 68.9  
Less than 10 hours per week (%) 0.2 16.4 <0.001  0.4 17.4 <0.001 
More than 10 hours per week (%) 0.2 11.7   1.2 13.7  
Labor market outcomes        
Any work (%) 74.8 77.8 0.377  34.4 40.2 0.085 
Weekly work hours (hours) 48.7 49.0 0.841  48.9 46.1 0.202 
Any employed work (%) 40.1 37.4 0.497  17.5 20.5 0.247 
Hourly wage rate (10K KRW) 1.26 1.54 0.026  0.61 0.57 0.680 
Notes: aFamily member include any parent, parent-in-law, and sibling or other relatives. 
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Table 5. Specification tests for instrumental variables for informal care 
Sample 
Extensive margin 
Intensive margin 
Strengths of instrumentsa
Test of 
exclusion 
restrictions 
Exogeneity 
test  Conclusion
b
Panel A: Continuous variable specification of hours of informal care 
Male (N =2,728)     
Any work   F(3, 2693) = 196.26*** chi2(2) = 0.029 
chi2(1) 
= 2.14 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours) 
if any F(3, 2000) = 114.88*** 
chi2(2) 
= 1.826 
F(1, 2001) 
= 0.39 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work F(3, 2693) = 196.26*** chi2(2) = 0.489 
chi2(1) 
= 0.26 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any F(3, 1009) = 59.34*** 
chi2(2) 
= 2.087 
F(1, 1010) 
= 0.20 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Female (N =3,366)     
Any work  F(3, 3331) = 128.63*** chi2(2) = 4.156 
chi2(1) 
= 2.23 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours)  
if any F(3, 2234) = 74.51*** 
chi2(2) 
= 0.803 
F(1, 1135) 
= 1.87 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work F(3, 3331) = 128.63*** chi2(2) = 4.133 
chi2(1) 
= 0.14 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any F(3, 547) = 40.65*** 
chi2(2) 
= 2.382 
F(1, 548) 
= 0.25 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Panel B: Dummy-variable specification with cutoff at 10 hours of informal care per week 
 • 1 if 0 < care hours < 10 • 1 if care hours ≥ 10    
Male (N =2,728)     
Any work   • F(3, 2693)= 130.38*** • F(3, 2693)= 113.05*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.005 
chi2(2)  
= 2.38 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours) 
if any 
• F(3, 2000)= 122.23*** 
• F(3, 2000)= 45.74*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.276 
F(2, 1999)  
= 0.48 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work • F(3, 2693)= 130.38*** • F(3, 2693)= 113.05*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.029 
chi2(2)  
= 0.52 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any 
• F(3, 1009)= 56.71*** 
• F(3, 1009)= 30.83*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.329 
F(2, 1008)  
= 0.56 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Female (N =3,366)     
Any work  • F(3, 3331)= 168.28*** • F(3, 3331)= 90.08*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.223 
chi2(2)  
= 5.07† 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours)  
if any 
• F(3, 1134)= 64.62*** 
• F(3, 1134)= 45.56*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.606 
F(2, 1133)  
= 0.29 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work • F(3, 3331)= 168.28*** • F(3, 3331)= 90.08*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.245 
chi2(2)  
= 2.13 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any 
• F(3, 547)= 66.91*** 
• F(3, 547)= 10.97*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.396 
F(2, 546)  
= 0.57 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Notes: aThe instruments used are (1) whether parent(s) have ADL limitation; (2) whether parent(s)-in-law 
have any ADL limitation; and (3) whether any sibling or other relatives have any ADL limitation.  
bConclusion is based on statistical significance at the 5% level. Other variables included in the models are 
co-residence, age, marital status, education level, assets, house ownership, disability and poor self-rated 
health, whether both parents live together, parent's house ownership, parent's education, and fourteen 
region dummies. † p<0.10. *** p<0.001.  
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Table 6. Coefficient estimates in Probit models of Any work and OLS models of conditional 
logged weekly hours worked 
Dependent var. 
Independent var. of main interest Male Female 
Panel A: Continuous variable specification of hours of informal care 
Any work   
ln(1+ weekly hours of care) −0.059 −0.110* 
ln(weekly work hours) if any   
ln(1+ weekly hours of care) −0.005 −0.017 
Panel B: Dummy-variable specification with cutoff at 10 hours of informal care per week 
Any work   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.024 0.167 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.304 −0.506** 
ln(weekly work hours) if any   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.102 −0.273* 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.029 −0.018 
Panel C: Dummy-variable specification with cutoff at 20 hours of informal care per week 
Any work   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours <20 −0.122 0.068 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 −0.166 −0.597** 
ln(weekly work hours) if any   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours < 20 0.117 −0.205† 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 −0.138 −0.072 
Notes: Other variables included in the models are co-residence, age, marital status, education level, assets, 
house ownership, disability and poor self-rated health, whether both parents live together, parent's house 
ownership, parent's education, and fourteen region dummies. † p<0.10. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
 
 33
Table 7. Coefficient estimates in Probit models of Any employed work and OLS models of 
conditional logged hourly wage rate 
Dependent var. 
Independent var. of main interest Male Female 
Panel A: Continuous variable specification of hours of informal care 
Any employed work   
ln(1+ weekly hours of care) −0.022 −0.065 
ln(hourly wage rate) if any   
ln(1+ weekly hours of care) 0.060* −0.037 
Panel B: Dummy-variable specification with cutoff at 10 hours of informal care per week 
Any employed work   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours < 10 −0.140 0.207 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.065 −0.437† 
ln(hourly wage rate) if any   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.168† −0.014 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 0.099 −0.151† 
Panel C: Dummy-variable specification with cutoff at 20 hours of informal care per week 
Any employed work   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours <20 −0.157 0.049 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 0.011 −0.362 
ln(hourly wage rate) if any   
No informal care hour (Ref.) - - 
0 < Informal care hours < 20 0.123 −0.016 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 0.180 −0.176† 
Notes: Other variables included in the model are co-residence, age, marital status, education level, assets, 
house ownership, disability and poor self-rated health, whether both parents live together, parent's house 
ownership, parent's education, and fourteen region dummies. † p<0.10. * p<0.05. 
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Table 8. Bootstrapped incremental effects of informal care on labor market outcomes 
 Male [95% C.I.] Female [95% C.I.] 
Panel A1: 0 < Weekly care hours < 10     
Pr(Any work) 0.010 [−0.163, 0.149] 0.060 [−0.075, 0.206] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) 5.458 [−3.390, 15.34] −12.23 [−27.21, 3.598] 
E(weekly hours worked) 4.551 [−5.936, 14.00] −1.645 [−11.91, 6.203] 
Pr(Any employed work) −0.025 [−0.184, 0.148] 0.060 [−0.041, 0.194] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.415 [−0.147, 1.300] −0.034 [−0.202, 0.182] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.127 [−0.206, 0.439] 0.029 [−0.040, 0.109] 
Panel A2: Weekly care hours ≥ 10     
Pr(Any work) −0.117 [−0.307, 0.036] −0.152* [−0.238, −0.050] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) −1.437 [−16.89, 12.66] −0.833 [−14.82, 20.67] 
E(weekly hours worked) −6.671 [−20.83, 3.786] −7.660 [−15.58, 0.284] 
Pr(Any employed work) 0.004 [−0.181, 0.188] −0.082* [−0.142, −0.007] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.367 [−0.237, 1.243] −0.165* [−0.265, −0.066] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.144 [−0.306, 0.506] −0.077* [−0.127, −0.033] 
Panel B1: 0 < Weekly care hours < 20     
Pr(Any work) −0.028 [−0.175, 0.094] 0.025 [−0.084, 0.154] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) 6.312 [−2.965, 13.95] −10.38 [−22.82, 4.813] 
E(weekly hours worked) 3.406 [−6.897, 11.34] −2.368 [−10.29, 4.508] 
Pr(Any employed work) −0.031 [−0.185, 0.121] 0.016 [−0.065, 0.118] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.317 [−0.167, 0.914] −0.035 [−0.179, 0.152] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.082 [−0.222, 0.346] 0.004 [−0.063, 0.067] 
Panel B2: Weekly care hours ≥ 20     
Pr(Any work) −0.093 [−0.286, 0.080] −0.174* [−0.266, −0.041] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) −6.312 [−22.24, 11.01] −3.363 [−19.02, 19.93] 
E(weekly hours worked) −9.294 [−29.65, 2.687] −9.638* [−18.66, −0.985] 
Pr(Any employed work) 0.032 [−0.183, 0.248] −0.069 [−0.149, 0.031] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.591 [−0.246, 1.789] −0.187* [−0.292, −0.079] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.262 [−0.296, 0.654] −0.073* [−0.120, −0.010] 
Notes: Bias-corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals derived from 1,000 repetitions are shown in 
brackets. * p<0.05. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized relation between labor market attachment and care intensity by gender 
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Appendix. Questions related to informal care in the KLoSA questionnaire 
 
Q1. Are there any members of your family over the age 10 (spouse, parents, parents of 
spouse, siblings and/or children) who are unable to carry out activities of daily living 
(ADL)? Activities of daily living refer to everyday routines such as eating, dressing, 
bathing or using the toilet, etc. Please identify all members of family with ADL 
difficulties. (Select from the list displayed by CAPI)  
02 Spouse  
03 Mother  
04 Father  
05 Mother-in-law  
06 Father-in-law  
07 ~ 16 Children  
27 ~ 40 Sibling  
47 Brother/sister-in-law of spouse  
48 Son/daughter-in-law  
49 Grandchildren  
50 Other relatives  
 
Q2. Did you provide (names listed in Q1) any help with activities of daily living during 
the past 12 months (not calendar year)? If so, who was helped? (Select from the list 
displayed by CAPI) 
 
Q3. During the past 12 months (not calendar year), roughly how many hours per week 
did you help out [name chosen from Q2]? _____hours per week  
 
Q4. How many weeks did you provide such care to [name chosen from Q2] during the 
past 12 months? ______weeks 
 
Q5. Did you help any of your family members (spouse, parents, parents of spouse, 
siblings and/or children) who are not living with you with other things such as household 
chores, errands, transportation, grocery shopping, financial management, etc.? If you did, 
who was helped? Please identify all family members whom you helped out during the 
past 12 months. (Select from the list displayed by CAPI)  
 
Q6. During the past 12 months (not calendar year), roughly how many hours per week 
did you help out [name chosen from Q5]? _____hours per week 
  
Q7. How many weeks did you provide such care to [name chosen from Q5] during the 
past 12 months? ______weeks 
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